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SCHOOLS—HANDICAPPED CHILDREN:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT DO NOT CATEGORICALLY
BAR TUITION REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNILATERAL
PRIVATE-SCHOOL PLACEMENTS
Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009)
ABSTRACT
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the United States Supreme
Court held the 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) do not mandate that a child must have received special
education or related services under the authority of a public agency to be
eligible to receive tuition reimbursement for a placement in private school.
Allowing school districts to avoid reimbursing parents for the cost of their
child’s private special education by claiming the child never received special education in public school would create a perverse incentive for school
districts not to identify children as eligible for special education or related
services. In so holding, the Court concluded IDEA continues to authorize
reimbursement for the costs of special education and related services when
school districts fail to provide a free, appropriate public education, and
where placement in private school is appropriate under IDEA. Although no
categorical bar exists to reimbursement when a child has not previously
received special education in public school, tuition reimbursement remains
an equitable remedy to be granted by courts in some, but not all, circumstances. After Forest Grove, courts remain free to grant or deny reimbursement based on equitable considerations, such as whether the party seeking
reimbursement provided to the school district sufficient notice of its intent
to place the child in private school. Forest Grove removed the categorical
bar to tuition reimbursement some circuit courts of appeals had read into
the 1997 Amendments, and made clear that tuition reimbursement is an
available remedy to be granted when warranted by the equities.
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FACTS

T.A. was born on September 11, 1985.1 Beginning in kindergarten, he
attended public school in the Forest Grove School District of Forest Grove,
Oregon (School District).2 Throughout his elementary school years, T.A.’s
teachers noticed he had difficulty paying attention in class and completing
his schoolwork.3 With extensive help from his parents and sister, however,
T.A. managed to pass from grade to grade.4
T.A.’s difficulties became increasingly evident while he attended
Forest Grove High School (FGHS).5 In December 2000, while T.A. was a
freshman at FGHS, T.A.’s mother contacted his school counselor to discuss
T.A.’s problems with his schoolwork.6 The school counselor suspected
T.A. might have a learning disability and referred him for an evaluation to
determine whether he qualified for special education services under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482
(IDEA or the Act).7 The School District provided notice to T.A.’s mother
1. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Brief of Respondent at 7, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009) (No. 08305).
4. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081. For example, by the time T.A. entered high school in
September 2000, his mother was working with him on his schoolwork at least two hours per day.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 3, at 7. In November 2001, with his mother still helping him with
schoolwork, T.A.’s parents hired his sister to tutor him ten hours per week. Id. at 9. An administrative hearing officer later noted, without the aid of his mother and sister, T.A. would not have
advanced through grades at Forest Grove High School. Id.
5. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2488.
6. Id.
7. Id. A school psychologist issued a report in September 2001 stating T.A. was not eligible
for services under IDEA because he had no learning disability. Id.
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of its intent to evaluate T.A. for special education services, and she consented.8 The School District also provided T.A.’s parents with notice of
procedural safeguards available to them under IDEA.9 The notice discussed
situations in which parents who enroll their children in private school may
10
be reimbursed for the cost of placement. According to the notice, where
parents unilaterally enrolled a child in private school, the School District
would reimburse the parents for those costs “only if . . . the child received
special education and related services under the authority of a public agency
before enrolling in the private school.”11
Throughout the first half of 2001, several of the School District’s psychologists and educational specialists evaluated T.A.12 On June 13, 2001, a
team of school officials, including psychologists and educational specialists, determined T.A. did not have a learning disability and was therefore
ineligible for special education.13 T.A.’s mother agreed with the psychologist’s decision that T.A. did not have a learning disability and was ineligible
for special education services under the Act.14 Throughout the rest of
T.A.’s time at FGHS, neither of his parents requested additional evaluations
regarding whether T.A. was eligible for special education.15
Over the next two years, T.A. continued to struggle academically.16
Again concerned that T.A. had a learning disability, T.A.’s parents hired
Dr. Fulop, a psychologist, in early 2003.17 Dr. Fulop evaluated T.A. on
February 21 and 24, 2003.18 Following those sessions, Dr. Fulop diagnosed
T.A. with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a math
disorder.19 On March 14, 2003, Dr. Fulop informed T.A.’s parents of his
diagnosis and stated T.A. “had several learning problems and academic
8. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 08-305). Under federal law,
public agencies, most often school districts, must attempt to obtain parental consent before
conducting an initial evaluation to determine whether a child is eligible for special-education
services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006).
9. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 8. For an overview of IDEA’s procedural safeguards,
including the roles of the administrative law judge and the federal district court in IDEA cases, see
M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1096-98 (11th Cir.
2006).
10. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 8.
11. Id. The language in the notice closely resembled that of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
(2006).
12. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d at 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 2005).
17. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082.
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 10.
19. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082. Dr. Fulop also diagnosed T.A. with cannabis abuse and
dysthmic disorder, a type of depression. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11.
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limitations, as well as [a] math disorder.”20 Dr. Fulop therefore recommended a residential program for T.A.21 According to Dr. Fulop, the
residential treatment facility at Mount Bachelor Academy, a residential
private school, would provide an environment that could help T.A. with his
learning difficulties, ADHD, and behavioral problems.22 On the basis of
that recommendation, T.A.’s parents removed him from public school and,
on March 24, 2003, enrolled him in Mount Bachelor Academy.23
T.A.’s parents hired an attorney on March 28, 2003.24 On April 18,
2003, seeking an order that would require FGHS to evaluate T.A. for “all
areas of suspected disability,” T.A.’s parents requested a hearing pursuant
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).25 It was at this time FGHS first learned of T.A.’s
placement at Mount Bachelor Academy.26 The Office of Administrative
Hearings for the State of Oregon began the hearing in May 2003, but the
hearing officer continued the hearing until September 2003 to allow the
School District to further evaluate T.A.27 Medical and educational specialists from the School District evaluated T.A. during the summer of 2003 and
determined he was not eligible for services under IDEA.28 On January 26,
2004, the hearing officer issued an opinion, concluding T.A. was disabled
and therefore eligible for special education under IDEA.29 The hearing
20. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11.
21. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082.
22. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11. Mount Bachelor Academy was a private boarding school located in Prineville, Oregon; T.A. graduated from Mount Bachelor in June 2004. Id.
After an investigation by the Oregon Department of Human Services that centered on allegations
of mistreatment and humiliation of students, Mount Bachelor closed in late 2009. Barney Lerten,
DHS, Mount Bachelor Academy Settle Case, KTVZ.COM, Oct. 2, 2010, http://www.ktvz.com/
news/25258065/detail.html; Maia Szalavitz, An Oregon School for Troubled Teens is Under
Scrutiny, TIME, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1891082,00.html.
23. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082.
24. Id.
25. Id. Under IDEA, parents and local educational agencies involved in a complaint “shall
have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State
educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State
educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2006).
26. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 12. T.A.’s father communicated with FGHS regarding T.A.’s academic placement for some time before T.A. began attending Mount Bachelor Academy, but the Mount Bachelor placement was never discussed. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A.,
675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2009). In January 2003, because of T.A.’s academic and
behavioral difficulties, T.A.’s father arranged with FGHS for T.A. to finish high school through
Portland Community College (PCC). Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 10. After the February
sessions with Dr. Fulop, T.A.’s father notified FGHS that T.A. would attend PCC after medical
testing and a three-week “wilderness training program.” Id. On March 10, 2003, T.A.’s father
notified FGHS that T.A. was “officially disenrolled from FGHS and was registered at PCC.” Id. at
11. Then, on April 18, 2003, FGHS received notice of the request for a hearing under § 1415(f)
and learned of the private school placement. Id. at 12.
27. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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officer further ruled the School District failed to offer T.A. a free appropriate public education as required by IDEA and was therefore responsible
for the costs of T.A.’s placement at Mount Bachelor Academy.30
The School District appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon pursuant to
§ 1415(i).31 The district court concluded T.A. was statutorily ineligible for
reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C) because he had not previously received special education services through the public school, and thus, the
hearing officer erred as a matter of law in granting reimbursement.32 The
district court also concluded the facts of the case did not warrant reimbursement under general principles of equity.33 T.A. appealed the district court’s
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.34
On appeal from the district court, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue
of whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) “bars private school reimbursement for students who have not ‘previously received special education and related services,’ or whether those students remain eligible for private school reimbursement, as they were before [the 1997 Amendments to IDEA (1997
Amendments)] under principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).”35
The Ninth Circuit held a student who never received special education and
related services from a school district is not barred as a matter of law from
recovering the costs of private education.36 Finding the statutory requirements of § 1412(a)(10)(C) inapplicable to the case, the court held students
who have not previously received special education through a public
agency are eligible for reimbursement “to the same extent as before the
1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’ relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).”37
30. Id. at 1082-83.
31. Id. at 1083. The IDEA guarantees that:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k)
who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g), and any party aggrieved
by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a
civil action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the
United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
32. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083. The district court refused to reimburse T.A.’s parents
for the cost of T.A.’s placement because “[t]he plainest reading of [§ 1412(a)(10)(C)] is that only
children who had previously received special education services from the District are even eligible
for such tuition reimbursement.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (D.
Or. 2005).
33. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083. T.A. argued even if § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not authorize
reimbursement in this case, the hearing officer could award reimbursement at her discretion under
general principles of equity. Forest Grove, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
34. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083.
35. Id. at 1086.
36. Id. at 1087-88.
37. Id. at 1088.
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The court therefore reversed the district court’s ruling that T.A. was not
entitled to reimbursement as a matter of law.38
The Ninth Circuit also held the district court abused its discretion in
denying reimbursement because the district court made two distinct legal
errors.39 First, the district court erred by considering inapplicable statutory
requirements from § 1412(a)(10)(C) in its analysis of the equities.40
Because neither T.A. nor the School District disputed that T.A. never
received special education or related services through the School District,
the district court incorrectly considered the statutory requirements of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C).41 Second, the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it stated tuition reimbursement was available only in extreme
cases.42 The Ninth Circuit noted nothing in § 1412(a)(10)(C), Supreme
Court precedent, or Ninth Circuit precedent, suggested reimbursement was
only available in extreme cases.43 The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the
district court’s denial of reimbursement and remanded the case to the
district court.44
The School District filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.45 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
determine whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) established a categorical bar to tuition
reimbursement for students who had not previously received special education services under the authority of a public education agency.46 Noting the
1997 Amendments did not alter the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and refusing
to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) to alter that provision’s meaning, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special education services regardless of whether the
child previously received special education or related services through the
public school.47 Because the district court found T.A. ineligible for tuition
reimbursement as a matter of law, and did not properly consider the equities
regarding whether reimbursement was warranted, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court.48
38. Id.
39. Id. The Ninth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard because “IDEA makes
clear that the district court exercises its discretion in fashioning appropriate relief.” Id. at 1084.
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (2006)).
40. Id. at 1088.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1089.
45. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2009).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2496.
48. Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the Supreme Court analyzed
the 1997 Amendments to determine whether the amendments categorically
barred reimbursement when a child had not previously received special
education or related services through a public agency.49 Thus, to understand the Court’s analysis, it is necessary to examine the 1997 Amendments.50 To provide the appropriate context, it is useful to examine learning disabilities in general51 and how Congress and the United States
Supreme Court have shaped the educational landscape for children with
learning disabilities.52
A. LEARNING DISABILITIES
Congress has determined “[d]isability is a natural part of the human
experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate
in or contribute to society” and “[i]mproving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of
ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”53 The term
“learning disability” does not describe a distinct disability.54 Instead, the
term is an invented category of special education composed of seven
specific areas of disability, including receptive language, expressive
language, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, written expression,
mathematics calculation, and mathematical reasoning.55 Most children who
have learning disabilities have more than one of the seven subtypes.56
1.

Learning Disabilities, Generally

Learning disabilities can be persistent disorders that may not respond
well to general or inappropriate instruction.57 Thus, appropriate instruction
is key, and educational interventions are most likely to succeed if carried
out by expert teachers.58 Early intervention is also vital because students
49. Id. at 2490.
50. See discussion infra Part II.D (explaining the reimbursement provisions of the 1997
Amendments).
51. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (discussing learning disabilities, generally).
52. See discussion infra Part II.B-C (outlining Supreme Court decisions as well as statutes
commonly cited by courts in IDEA reimbursement cases).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006).
54. G. Reid Lyon, Learning Disabilities, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 54, 55, 60 (1996).
55. Id. at 60.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 71.
58. Id.
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with learning disabilities attain higher levels of educational achievement
when they are identified early in their educational careers.59 Despite the
need for early intervention, most children with learning disabilities are not
identified until the third or fourth grade.60
2.

Public Special Education Before IDEA

Throughout much of the history of public education in America, services to disabled children were provided at the discretion of local school
districts.61 School districts possessed tremendous discretion regarding the
identification and education of children with special needs.62 According to
the United States Department of Education, “in 1970, U.S. schools educated
only one in five children with disabilities, and many states had laws excluding certain [disabled] students.”63 In 1975, congressional hearings revealed
almost one million children with disabilities were receiving no education at
all, and an additional 3.5 million were not receiving an education appropriate to their needs.64 In response to the need for identification and education of children with learning disabilities, and in response to discrimination
against children with special needs, Congress passed the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975.65

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. EDWIN W. MARTIN ET AL., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special Education,
6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25, 26 (1996).
62. Jordan L. Wilson, Missing the Big Idea: The Supreme Court Loses Sight of the Policy
Behind the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 HOUS. L. REV.
161, 163 (2007).
63. History: Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities, U.S.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last
visited Mar. 12, 2011). The United States Code provides:
Before the date of enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 (Public Law 94-142), the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were not being fully met because (A) the children did not receive appropriate
educational services; (B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school
system and from being educated with their peers; (C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a successful educational experience; or (D) a lack of
adequate resources within the public school system forced families to find services
outside the public school system.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006); see also Pa. Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of
Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1971) (per curiam) (enjoining Pennsylvania public school officials
from applying state law denying education to children with learning disabilities).
64. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 29.
65. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482); Wilson, supra note 62, at 166-67.
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B. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
This section introduces the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, now renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act.66 It also describes the responsibilities states assume by accepting
IDEA funds, including the identification of disabled children and providing
those children with free, appropriate public education.67
1.

Overview

President Gerald Ford signed The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act into law in 1975, and the Act took effect on October 1, 1977.68
The title of the Act was changed by amendment in 1990 to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act,69 and again by amendment in 2004 to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act.70 Congress enacted IDEA to aid states in educating students with disabilities by providing
federal funding of state efforts.71 At the heart of the IDEA is the principle
that a disabled child should receive from public schools a free education,
administered in the least restrictive environment, that is individualized to
the child’s unique needs.72
The United States Supreme Court has described IDEA as “a comprehensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the States in complying with their
constitutional obligations to provide public education for [children with
disabilities],”73 and “an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of
handicapped children.”74 The Act did not create substantive educational
standards, but rather elaborate procedural safeguards to facilitate parental
involvement in school decisions.75 Nor does the Act protect every student
with a disability, but only those students with a disability included in IDEA
that adversely impacts the student’s education.76 In the case of a student

66. See infra Part II.B.1.
67. See infra Part II.B.2.
68. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 30.
69. Id. at 29.
70. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482). Despite the renaming of the Act
in 2004, it is still acceptable to cite the Act as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 20
U.S.C. § 1400(a).
71. MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 72 (1998).
72. Wilson, supra note 62, at 167.
73. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
74. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982).
75. YELL, supra note 71, at 72.
76. Id. at 73.
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whose disability adversely affects his or her education, IDEA places upon
states certain responsibilities to provide appropriate special education.77
2.

States’ Responsibilities Under IDEA

Although states are not required to participate in IDEA,78 each of the
fifty states currently receives IDEA funding.79 As a consequence of their
participation, states have specific responsibilities under the Act, including
the implementation of a “child-find” system to locate all disabled students
from the ages of three to twenty-one residing within the state.80 In addition
to locating children with disabilities, states and school districts are required
to make available to all children with disabilities a free appropriate public
education.81 To that end, states and school districts are required to make
available to children identified as disabled under IDEA an individualized
education program.82
a.

Free Appropriate Public Education

The purpose of IDEA is “to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs
[and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or
guardians are protected.”83 Thus, IDEA requires states to provide to
children with learning disabilities a “free appropriate public education”
(FAPE).84 The Act defines a FAPE as:
[S]pecial education and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school,
or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are

77. See infra Part II.B.2.
78. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 30.
79. Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule
for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1091-92 (2010).
80. YELL, supra note 71, at 74; Seligmann, supra note 79, at 1092.
81. Richard Apling & Nancy Lee Jones, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Overview of Major Provisions, in THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 1-2 (Ian
O. Javier ed., 2005); see discussion infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing states’ responsibilities to
provide all students with disabilities a free appropriate public education).
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006).
83. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(c)).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
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provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of [the Act].85
The IDEA defines “special education” as “specifically designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability.”86 The Act defines “related services” as services that “may be
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.”87 Under IDEA, related services include transportation and other
supportive services such as physical, occupational, and speech therapy.88
b.

The Individualized Education Program

To ensure each child identified as disabled under IDEA receives a
FAPE, school districts must create for each disabled child within the district
an “individualized education program.”89 The IDEA defines the term “individualized education program” (IEP) as “a written statement for each child
with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with
section 1414(d) of [the Act].”90 States or school districts developing an IEP
must include in the program, among other things, “a statement of the child’s
present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, . . . a
statement of measurable annual goals, . . . [and] a description of how the
child’s progress towards meeting [those] annual goals will be measured[.]”91 IDEA mandates procedural requirements in the IEP formulation
process to ensure parents and school officials develop an appropriate IEP.92
If dissatisfied with a proposed IEP, parents may challenge its appropriateness both administratively and judicially.93 Interpretation of a standard
of appropriateness has been “difficult because of the diversity of the special
education population.”94 Neither Congress nor the courts have provided a
precise definition of an “appropriate education.”95 Rather, courts have set

85. Id.
86. Id. § 1401(29).
87. Id. § 1401(26)(A).
88. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 36.
89. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).
91. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
92. YELL, supra note 71, at 169.
93. Parents may challenge the appropriateness of a proposed IEP administratively by requesting an impartial due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). After exhausting all available
administrative remedies, parents dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative proceedings
“have the right to bring a civil action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a
district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” Id.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
94. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 34.
95. Id.
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out “broad principles to be applied [in] individual circumstances.”96 The
principles can generally be summarized as requiring an educational program that “is (1) related to the child’s learning capacity, (2) specially
designed for the child’s unique needs and not merely what is offered to
others, and (3) reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit.”97
C. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE IDEA AND
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRIVATE SPECIAL EDUCATION
IDEA mandates a school district that cannot provide a disabled student
a FAPE must provide and fund an appropriate private school placement.98
The Supreme Court has considered several cases concerning reimbursement
under IDEA for private special education services.99 Two cases decided
prior to the 1997 Amendments have provided the basic legal framework for
IDEA reimbursement cases:
School Committee of Burlington v.
100
Department of Education and Florence County School District Four v.
Carter.101
1.

Burlington

In Burlington, the father of a public school student, dissatisfied with
the school’s proposed IEP, unilaterally placed his child in a state-approved
private school for special education.102 Following a lengthy administrative
and judicial process, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two
issues: (1) whether reimbursement to parents for private school placement
is appropriate relief under IDEA; and (2) whether the Act “bars such
reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a
private school without the consent of local school authorities.”103 At the
time of the decision in Burlington, IDEA made no explicit reference to
reimbursement, but rather authorized a court to “grant such relief as the
In determining what relief is
court determines is appropriate.”104
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Emily S. Rosenblum, Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to the IDEA: Did Congress
Intend to Limit the Remedy of Private School Tuition Reimbursement for Disabled Children?, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2734 (2009); see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed., 471
U.S. 259, 370 (1985).
99. See discussion infra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing cases often cited by courts in IDEA
reimbursement cases).
100. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
101. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
102. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 362.
103. Id. at 367.
104. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2009) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006)).
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appropriate under the Act, consideration must be given to “the Act’s broad
purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through
publicly funded private-school placements when necessary.”105 The Court
held the grant of authority in § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) included “the power to
order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on
private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that
such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.”106
2.

Carter

In Carter, the parents of a public school student were dissatisfied with
the public school’s proposed IEP.107 The parents unilaterally withdrew the
student from public school and enrolled her in a private school.108 The
parents then sued the school district, seeking reimbursement for costs
incurred as a result of the private school placement.109 The district court
found the private school did not comply with all IDEA requirements because it was not a state-approved private school for special education, but it
provided the student with an appropriate education under IDEA.110 The
district court held, although the private school did not meet every IDEA
requirement, the student’s education at the private school was appropriate
under IDEA and the parents were therefore entitled to reimbursement.111
The school district appealed, arguing IDEA did not permit reimbursement when parents unilaterally removed their child from public school and
placed the child in a private school that did not meet every IDEA requirement.112 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the
district court’s decision, holding placement in a private school not approved
by the state is not a bar to reimbursement.113 Citing Burlington, the court
concluded IDEA “imposes only two prerequisites to reimbursement: that
the program proposed by the state failed to provide the child a free appropriate public education, and that the private school in which the child is
enrolled succeeded in providing an appropriate education[.]”114 The school

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 2491 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369).
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Carter v. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 164.
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district filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.115
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carter to determine whether a
court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally enrolled their
child in private school when the private school did not meet every IDEA
requirement, but nonetheless provided an appropriate education under the
Act.116 The Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding
courts “may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw
their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education
under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education
that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all the requirements
of [the Act].”117 Thus, the Court reaffirmed the availability of reimbursement for the costs of private special education, even where a child was
placed in a private school that had not been approved by the State, so long
as the school district failed to provide a FAPE and the placement was
proper under the Act.118 The Court decided Carter in 1993, four years
before Congress extensively amended IDEA.119
D. THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO IDEA
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA, adding several significant provisions and restructuring the Act to make it easier to understand.120
Congress’s purpose in passing the 1997 Amendments was to improve the
performance and educational achievement of students with disabilities, as
the goal of child identification had largely been met.121 Congress mandated
several changes to the IEP requirements, including the implementation of
measurable, annual educational goals.122 The 1997 Amendments also
required states to conduct state- and district-wide assessments on the
inclusion of students with disabilities.123 As part of the Act’s restructuring,
§ 1415(e)(2), the provision of IDEA relied upon by the Burlington Court in
granting reimbursement as appropriate relief, was renumbered
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).124 Despite the renumbering, Congress left the text of

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Carter, 510 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2009).
See infra Part II.D.
YELL, supra note 71, at 87.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 n.5 (2009).
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the provision unaltered.125 Thus, the provision of the Act interpreted by the
Supreme Court to authorize reimbursement as appropriate relief under
IDEA was left unchanged.126
The 1997 Amendments affected or created several IDEA provisions.127
One new provision, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (clause (i)), makes clear IDEA does
not require a school district to reimburse parents of a child with disabilities
for the cost of the child’s private special education “if [the district] made a
free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents
elected to place the child in [the] private school or facility.”128 Under
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (clause (ii)), a court or hearing officer may require
such reimbursement “if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency
had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child” and
the child has “previously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency.”129 Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)
(clause (iii)) addresses the circumstances in which a reimbursement under
clause (ii) “may be reduced or denied,” such as when parents fail to provide
the district notice of the private school placement.130
E. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE IDEA
REIMBURSEMENT PROVISIONS
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove, federal appellate courts that considered the issue of whether the 1997 Amendments categorically barred reimbursement when a child had not previously received

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2491-92.
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2006). Clause (i) reads:
Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of
a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child
in such private school or facility.
Id.
129. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Clause (ii), entitled “Reimbursement for private school
placement,” reads:
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education
and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private
elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents
for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had
not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner
prior to that enrollment.
Id.
130. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). A parent’s failure to give adequate notice may be excused in
certain circumstances. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv).
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special education or related services reached inconsistent results.131 The
First Circuit held reimbursement was barred in such circumstances,132 while
the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reached the opposite result.133
This section examines the string of IDEA reimbursement cases leading to
the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to resolve the issue in Forest Grove.
1.

Greenland School District v. Amy N.

In Greenland School District v. Amy N.,134 the parents of a public
school student unilaterally placed the student in private school after her
fourth-grade year, never having discussed with the public school the possibility of the public school providing special education.135 The parents
sought tuition reimbursement for the girl’s entire fifth-grade year and part
of her sixth-grade year.136 The district court reversed the hearing officer’s
award of reimbursement, holding the parents were not entitled to reimbursement.137 Quoting Burlington for the proposition that “parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement . . . without the consent of state or
local school officials do so at their own financial risk,” the First Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed.138
2.

M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. School Board of
Miami-Dade County, Florida

In M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. School Board of Miami-Dade County,
Florida,139 the parents of a child with profound hearing loss enrolled the
child in a private preschool.140 The child was never enrolled in public
school and, therefore, never received special education services through a
public agency.141 The district court dismissed the parents’ complaint and
the parents appealed.142 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
131. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2490.
132. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60 (1st Cir. 2004). The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals hinted in dicta and in an unpublished opinion that it might have followed
the First Circuit’s logic. See Rosenblum, supra note 98, at 2767-68.
133. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2008); Frank G. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006); M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of
Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
134. 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004).
135. Greenland, 358 F.3d at 152.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 162 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74
(1985)).
139. 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006).
140. M.M., 437 F.3d at 1098.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1102.
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“parents are not required in all cases to first enroll their child in public
school pursuant to an inadequate IEP in order to preserve their right to
reimbursement.”143 Although the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless agreed with
the district court that the parents’ complaint should have been dismissed,
albeit for different reasons, the court’s ruling made clear that parents could
be reimbursed, at least in theory, for special education services received as
the result of a unilateral placement.
3.

Frank G. v. Board of Education of Hyde Park

Six months after the Eleventh Circuit decided M.M., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals issued its decision in Frank G. v. Board of Education of
Hyde Park.144 The Second Circuit held the IDEA reimbursement provisions did not require the receipt of special education services by a state
agency as a prerequisite to tuition reimbursement.145 In so holding, the
Second Circuit declined to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) as requiring a child to
have previously received special education or related services prior to
becoming eligible for tuition reimbursement.146 Although at first blush the
Frank G. decision seemed to be at odds with the First Circuit’s conclusion
in Greenland, the Second Circuit noted it too would have denied the
reimbursement sought by the parents in Greenland, but not on the grounds
that the child never received special education services.147 Rather, the
Second Circuit stressed parents must provide notice to the public school of
their child’s need for special education services, which the parents in
Greenland failed to do.148 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded it would
have denied reimbursement in Greenland because the parents’ failure to
provide notice of the child’s need would have precluded the parents from
being equitably entitled to tuition reimbursement.149

143. Id. at 1099 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70).
144. 459 F.3d 356 (2006). United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, then a
Second Circuit Judge, sat on the panel that decided Frank G., 459 F.3d at 359. In 2009, Justice
Sotomayor left the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to fill the seat vacated by retiring Justice
David Souter. Interestingly, Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinion in Forest Grove.
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting).
145. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376.
146. Id. at 359.
147. Id. at 376.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Board of Education of City School District of
New York v. Tom F.

On August 9, 2006, in light of its decision in Frank G., the Second
Circuit vacated a district court’s reversal of an award of tuition reimbursement in which the district court “reach[ed] the same conclusion as to the
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C) that the First Circuit reached in [Greenland
School Dist. v.] Amy N.”150 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Board
of Education of City School District of New York v. Tom F.151 to resolve the
lingering IDEA reimbursement question.152 In Tom F., after Justice
Kennedy recused himself, the Court split 4-4, affirming without opinion the
judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and leaving the circuits
split on the issue.153
5.

Forest Grove School District v. T.A.

In Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district
court ruling that found T.A.’s parents ineligible for tuition reimbursement
under § 1412(a)(10)(C) because T.A. never received special education or
related services in public school.154 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Forest Grove in order to once again address the question of whether
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) authorized the award of tuition reimbursement only in the
case where a child had previously received special education or related
services.155
III. ANALYSIS
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito.156 The majority held the 1997 Amendments to
IDEA did not create a categorical bar to reimbursement when a child had
not previously received special education or related services under the
authority of a public agency.157 Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.158

150. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C. v. Tom F., No. 01 Civ. 6845(GBD), 2005 WL
22866, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005).
151. 552 U.S. 1 (2007).
152. Tom F., 552 U.S. at 2.
153. Id.
154. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2489 (2009).
155. Id. at 2490.
156. Id. at 2487.
157. Id. at 2488.
158. Id. at 2487.
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority first identified the analysis in Burlington as the
appropriate analytical framework for the dispute in Forest Grove.159 Next,
the majority concluded the 1997 Amendments to IDEA did not require a
reading of the Act’s reimbursement provision that is inconsistent with the
Court’s decision in Burlington.160 Finally, the Court concluded a rule denying reimbursement when a child had not previously received special education through the public school would not comport with the IDEA’s remedial
purpose, and would produce an irrational rule.161 The Court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions for the district court to consider
the equities of the case on remand.162
1.

Burlington is the Appropriate Legal Background

The majority began by noting the unanimous opinion in Burlington
provided the appropriate legal background for the Court’s analysis in Forest
Grove.163 The majority then distinguished the dispute in Forest Grove from
the disputes in Burlington and Carter because Forest Grove did not concern
the adequacy of a proposed IEP, but rather the School District’s failure to
provide an IEP at all.164 Also, unlike the children in Burlington and Carter,
T.A. had not previously received special education or related services
through the public schools.165 The Court dismissed the factual differences
as irrelevant because the Court’s decisions in Burlington and Carter “depended on the language and purpose of the Act and not the particular facts
involved.”166 The majority then noted a school district’s failure to propose
an IEP is as serious a violation under IDEA as failing to propose an adequate IEP.167 Thus, the Court noted a reimbursement could be authorized in
such an instance unless the 1997 Amendments required a different result.168
The Court then considered whether the 1997 Amendments established a
categorical bar to tuition reimbursement when a student had not received
169
special education or related services in public school.
159. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the majority’s analysis of whether
Burlington applies to the question presented in Forest Grove).
160. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2490.
164. Id. at 2491.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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The 1997 Amendments Do Not Support the School District’s
Reading of the IDEA’s Reimbursement Provisions

The majority reiterated the Burlington Court’s statement that
Congress’s purpose in enacting the IDEA was “to ensure that all children
with disabilities are provided ‘a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of [such] children and their
parents or guardians are protected.’”170 The 1997 Amendments furthered
that goal by preserving the Act’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all
children with disabilities.171
Congress did not alter the text of
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which the Court construed in Burlington to allow
courts to provide reimbursement for the cost of private special education
when a school district failed to provide a FAPE, when it amended IDEA in
1997.172 The majority cited Lorillard v. Pons173 for the proposition that
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a
statute without change.”174 The Court found no clear expression in the
1997 Amendments, or elsewhere, of Congress’s intent to abrogate the
Court’s decisions in Burlington or Carter or to repeal some portion of
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).175 Thus, the Court declared it would continue to
construe that provision as providing reimbursement for private school
placement as “appropriate” relief when a school district failed to provide a
FAPE.176
The majority then addressed the School District’s argument that the
1997 Amendments effectively repealed at least a portion of
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).177 The School District relied primarily on clauses (i)
and (ii) for the proposition that “Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C) to
provide the exclusive source of authority for courts to order reimbursement
when parents unilaterally enroll a child in private school.”178 The School
District argued because § 1412(a)(10)(C) only discusses reimbursement for
children who have previously received special education through the public
school, reimbursement under IDEA is only appropriate in those

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985)).
Id. at 2491-92.
Id. at 2492.
434 U.S. 575 (1978).
Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2492 (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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circumstances.179 The majority rejected this argument.180 Notably, the
School District offered no evidence that Congress intended to supersede the
Court’s decisions in Burlington and Carter.181 Also, the majority noted the
1997 Amendments did not explicitly preclude reimbursement in this circumstance.182 Under clause (i), reimbursement is explicitly barred only
when a school district provides a FAPE and an adequate IEP.183 Because
clause (i) makes clear reimbursement is not authorized when a school
district provides a FAPE, the majority stated that the clause may be read to
indicate reimbursement is appropriate when a school district failed that
task.184
The majority then explained clause (ii) also failed to support the School
District’s position.185 Clause (ii) states that courts “may require” reimbursement in certain circumstances, but does not bar reimbursement in
other scenarios.186 The majority read clause (ii) together with clauses (iii)
and (iv) as “elaborating on the general rule that courts may order reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that
may affect a reimbursement award.”187 The factors are relevant in the common scenario in which a school district provides some special education but
the parents view the services as inadequate.188 Thus, the majority
interpreted the clauses of § 1412(a)(10)(C) as “elucidative rather than
exhaustive.”189
Finally, the majority stated its interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)
prevented the abrogation sub silentio by Congress of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Burlington and Carter.190 The majority cited Branch v.
Smith191 for its conclusion that “[i]t would take more than Congress’ failure
to comment on the category of cases in which a child has not previously
received special-education services for [the Court] to conclude that the
Amendments substantially superseded [the Court’s] decisions and in large

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. The dissent adopted this interpretation. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007)).
Id. at 2493-94.
538 U.S. 254 (2003).
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part repealed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).”192 Thus, the majority explained it would
continue to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) in a manner consistent with its decisions
in Burlington and Carter.193
The majority rejected the School District’s reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C)
because it found the argument at odds with the remedial purpose behind
IDEA, and particularly IDEA’s reimbursement provisions.194 Pointing to
the language of the Act, the majority reiterated the purpose of IDEA is to
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE]
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs.”195 A rule denying reimbursement when a child had not
previously received special-education services would leave the rights of
children with disabilities “less than complete.”196 The majority concluded
the School District’s reading also conflicted with the Act’s “child-find”
requirement because it would reward states for refusing to identify children
as in need of special-education services.197
3.

Avoiding an Irrational Rule

The majority refused to adopt the School District’s reading of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) because it would produce a rule that “immuniz[es] a
school district’s refusal to find a child eligible for special-education
services no matter how compelling the child’s need.”198 The resulting rule
would “border[] on the irrational” because the Act would then provide a
remedy when a school district provides inadequate special education
services, while failing to provide a remedy in the “more egregious situation
in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such
services altogether.”199 The majority noted the procedural safeguards
afforded to parents under the IDEA would not alleviate that “strange” result
because the review of a school’s failure to provide a FAPE is often delayed
and fails to proceed with the “speed necessary to avoid detriment to the
child’s education.”200

192. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494; see Branch, 538 U.S. at 273 (noting absent clearly
expressed congressional intent, repeals by implication are disfavored).
193. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494.
194. Id. at 2494-95.
195. Id. at 2494 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006)).
196. Id. at 2495 (citing Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370
(1985)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370).
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The Spending Clause

The School District argued because IDEA is a Spending Clause
statute,201 “and the Spending Clause requires Congress to give clear notice
of any obligation it imposes on the States as a condition of receiving federal
funds,”202 the absence of statutory text regarding reimbursement for unilateral placements prohibits reimbursement in such a circumstance.203 In
support of its argument, the School District noted the Supreme Court’s
holding in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy204 that IDEA does not authorize courts to award expert services
fees to parents because IDEA does not provide states notice of the possibility of such awards.205 In rejecting the School District’s Spending
Clause argument, the Court distinguished Forest Grove from Arlington.206
According to the Court, Forest Grove differed from Arlington because, as a
condition of accepting IDEA funding, “States expressly agree to provide a
FAPE to all children with disabilities.”207 By failing to provide a FAPE and
later reimbursing parents for the costs of private education, a school district
simply “belatedly pay[s] expenses that it should have paid all along.”208
The Court also stated Burlington provided notice to states that courts may
authorize reimbursement for the costs of private special education in
“appropriate circumstances.”209 Thus, despite the complete absence of
language in the Act regarding reimbursement for unilateral placements, the
Court imputed notice to the states.
5.

Financial Burden on Schools

The School District argued reading IDEA to authorize reimbursement
for unilateral private school placements would impose upon public school
districts a substantial financial burden.210 The majority disagreed, citing
Carter for the well established safeguard that the Act authorizes reimbursement “only [when] a federal court concludes both that the public placement
violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2006 (2007).
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 14.
Id. at 19.
548 U.S. 291 (2006).
Arlington, 548 U.S. at 304; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 17-18.
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009).
Id.
Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1985)).
Id.
Id. at 2496.
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Act.”211 Even when a court orders reimbursement, the majority noted the
award may be reduced “if the equities so warrant.”212 The equities to be
considered by the court contemplating reimbursement are presumed to
favor the school district.213 Also, parents who unilaterally enroll their child
in private school do so at their own risk.214 Because of the requirements for
reimbursement, the majority noted “the incidence of private-school
placement at public expense is quite small.”215 Thus, the majority’s holding
did not place upon public school districts a substantial financial burden.216
6.

Summary of Majority Opinion

The majority concluded the 1997 Amendments did not modify the text
of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) nor alter the provision’s meaning.217 Thus, the majority held IDEA “authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private specialeducation services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the
private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child
previously received special education or related services through the public
school.”218 The majority therefore affirmed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.219 The Court remanded the case to the district
court for that court to consider the equities and decide whether T.A.’s
parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement.220

211. Id. (citing Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)) (internal
citations omitted).
212. Id. The majority provided an example of one such circumstance: when parents fail to
provide the school district with adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school.
Id.
213. Id. (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62-63 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
214. Id. (citing Carter, 510 U.S. at 15).
215. Id. (citing Brief for Nat’l Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13-14, Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 08-305)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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B. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Souter’s dissent first rejected the majority’s reading of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as “overstretching.”221 Next, the dissent concluded,
despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Burlington and Carter
would be decided the same under its reading of the Act’s reimbursement
provisions because the dissent’s reading was consistent with those
decisions.222 Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s claim that reading
clause (ii) as restrictive effectively gave school districts a veto on
reimbursement awards.223
1.

Limitless Reimbursement

The dissent categorized the majority’s holding as placing no limit on
reimbursement for private tuition, despite what the dissent labeled a “clear
limitation imposed by § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).”224 Noting the Burlington
Court emphasized the lack of an IDEA provision addressing reimbursement
when it labeled reimbursement as appropriate relief under the Act, the dissent inferred Congress acted explicitly on the issue of reimbursement via
the 1997 Amendments, which added to the IDEA several provisions
“explicitly addressing the issue of ‘[p]ayment for education of children
enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.’”225 Justice Souter concluded the language in the 1997 Amendments
“generally prohibit[s] reimbursement if the school district made a [FAPE]
available, and if they are to have any effect, there is no exception except by
agreement or for a student who previously received special education
services that were inadequate.”226 Conceding IDEA’s silence on the case of
a child with no previous special education services and no FAPE, the
dissent rejected the majority’s conclusion that clause (ii) is merely “one of a
variety of circumstances in which such reimbursement is permitted.”227
Justice Souter cited Corley v. United States,228 in which the Court stated
221. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the dissent’s concern that the majority’s
rule places no limit on private tuition reimbursement).
222. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (concluding Burlington and Carter would be decided
the same under the dissent’s reading of IDEA’s reimbursement provisions).
223. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the dissent’s argument that IDEA’s
procedural safeguards protect parents against uncooperative school districts).
224. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 2498 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006)).
226. Id. at 2497 (internal citations omitted) (citing §§ 1412(a)(10)(B); 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)-(ii)).
227. Id. at 2499.
228. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).
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“[o]ne of the most basic interpretive cannons is that a statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,” for the proposition
that the majority’s conclusion was incorrect because it rendered clauses (ii)
and (iii) unnecessary.229 The dissent noted the majority’s interpretation
meant that, in both clauses (i) and (ii), “Congress meant to add nothing to
the statutory scheme.”230 To avoid such a result, the dissent would have
read clause (ii) to allow reimbursement only in the instance when a child
has previously received special education or related services in public
school.231
2.

Reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to Preclude Reimbursement in
this Circumstance Would Not Alter the Outcome of
Burlington or Carter

The dissent noted, in Burlington and Carter, both sets of parents were
parents of a child with a disability who previously received special education or related services under the authority of a public agency.232 In each of
those cases, the only question was whether parents who cooperated with the
school district in formulating an IEP, when all agreed the child was disabled, could be reimbursed for the subsequent placement of the child in
private school.233 Both cases held reimbursement was appropriate “if the
court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed
IEP, is proper under the Act.”234 Because the dissent would have read
clause (ii) as prohibiting reimbursement when a child has not previously
received special education services under the authority of a public agency,
the dissent’s interpretation of IDEA’s reimbursement provisions was consistent with those decisions.235
3.

No Conflict with the Remedial Purpose Behind IDEA

Justice Souter disputed the majority’s conclusion that reading
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) to prohibit reimbursement in the case of a child who has
not previously received special education services through the public school
was at odds with the general remedial purpose of the Act.236 The majority

229.
1560).
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2499 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Corley, 129 S. Ct. at
Id. at 2500.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
Id. at 2502.
Id.
Id. at 2501 (citing Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 2502.
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concluded the dissent’s reading would place control of reimbursement
awards solely in the hands of school districts because, by refusing to identify a child as in need of special education services, school districts would
be essentially immunized from having to pay for the child’s private special
education.237 The dissent countered by citing IDEA’s elaborate procedural
safeguards, which protect a child’s substantive rights under the Act, for the
proposition that the “administrative and judicial review [process] is the
answer to the Court’s claim that reading [clause (ii)] as restrictive, not
illustrative, immunizes a school district’s intransigence, giving it an effective veto on reimbursement for private placement.”238
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove has been characterized
as “an illusory win for parents” of children with disabilities.239 In reality,
however, the Court’s ruling at least represents a small triumph for such
parents when the result is measured against the other possible outcome.240
Importantly, Forest Grove, at the very least, prohibits § 1412(a)(10)(C)
from playing a gate-keeping role in IDEA reimbursement cases. That is,
after Forest Grove, courts can no longer dismiss claims for tuition reimbursement simply because the child whose education is at issue never received special education or related services in public school. Instead, courts
must analyze the equities of individual cases to determine whether reimbursement is proper in each circumstance. It may be true that many parents
are denied reimbursement after courts have weighed the equities of
particular cases, but such a result will rightly be based on an analysis of
several important factors, including parental cooperation with school
officials, and not simply on whether a child was fortuitous enough to have
previously received special education in public school.

237. Id.
238. Id. at 2503.
239. See Natalie Pyong Kocher, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA’s Inherent
Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 333, 348 (2010). One commentator stated:
Forest Grove is viewed as a victory for parents of children with disabilities who may
now seek reimbursement for private school tuition, even if their child never attended a
public school. The decision, however, provides no actual assurance to parents in this
atypical situation and only removes the absolute bar to tuition reimbursement, indicating that the actual implications of the decision may be less significant than they
appear.
Id. (emphasis added).
240. Had the Supreme Court ruled the 1997 Amendments to IDEA indeed imposed a
categorical bar to reimbursement in a case such as T.A.’s, parents of children like him would be
left without a remedy. Avoiding such a result is at least a small victory for parents of disabled
children.
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Having established the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove is of
some value to parents of children with disabilities, this part examines the
extent of the case’s impact. Section A examines the impact on Forest
Grove upon the special education litigation landscape. Next, section B
describes how Forest Grove reinforces the role of equitable principles in the
outcomes of IDEA reimbursement cases.
A. AN END TO COSTLY LITIGATION
The case represents the end to a split in the circuit courts of appeals
that led to costly, drawn-out litigation. The Forest Grove School District
reportedly spent at least $244,000 over a period of six years litigating
Forest Grove.241 Now that the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), school districts and parents will no longer find themselves in court arguing for or against a categorical bar to tuition reimbursement in cases like Forest Grove, Greenland, M.M., Frank G., and Tom F.
Of course, litigation remains a possibility when a district allegedly fails to
offer a FAPE and the parents determine private school placement is appropriate under IDEA, but Congress envisioned such litigation as necessary
242
when it drafted the Act.
The Forest Grove decision does nothing to
discourage that type of litigation, nor should it, but it does allow both
parties to enter into litigation knowing, at the very least, whether reimbursement in the case of a child who never received special education in a public
school is statutorily permissible.
B. THE EMPHASIS ON THE EQUITIES
In Forest Grove, the equities seemed to mitigate both for and against
an award of reimbursement. On the one hand, the School District’s initial
evaluation of T.A., which occurred two years before T.A.’s placement at
Mount Bachelor, proved to be substantially inaccurate.243 If the School
District would have identified T.A. as learning disabled and eligible for
special education in mid-2001, rather than forcing T.A.’s parents to hire an
independent specialist after two additional years of academic struggle,
perhaps the District would have had a better argument against reimbursement. On the other hand, although T.A.’s parents were mostly cooperative
241. Nancy Townsley, U.S. Supreme Court Interprets Law to Say that Parents of Special
Needs Students Can Seek Tuition Reimbursement for Private Schooling, FOREST GROVE NEWSTIMES, June 23, 2009, http://www.forestgrovenewstimes.com/news/story.php?story_id=
124582710640480800.
242. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing to the parties involved in such a circumstance
the right to bring a civil action in state or federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy).
243. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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with School District officials, they became less cooperative as the entire
process unfolded. For example, as mentioned above, T.A.’s parents provided the School District notice of T.A.’s placement at Mount Bachelor
only after enrolling him at the private school.244
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon weighed the equitable arguments
both for and against reimbursement.245 In its analysis, the court included a
discussion of each of the above factors and found the lack of notice provided by T.A.’s parents favored the School District, but the District’s
mishandling of the 2001 evaluation favored T.A.246 In holding reimbursement was not warranted in T.A.’s case, the district court identified the
“decisive factor” as the fact that T.A.’s parents apparently enrolled him in
Mount Bachelor not because of his learning disabilities, but because of his
drug abuse and behavioral problems.247 The court found compelling the
application to Mount Bachelor academy, which T.A.’s father completed on
248
T.A.’s behalf. On it, T.A.’s father listed the “enrollment was precipitated
by ‘inappropriate behavior, depression, opposition, drug use, runaway.’”249
Thus, the district court concluded “[t]he equities [did] not favor requiring
the District to reimburse T.A.’s parents for a decision to send T.A. to a
school because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems that [were]
unrelated to his difficulties focusing in school.”250
The district court’s decision not to award reimbursement on remand
brings to light the true impact of Forest Grove: although no categorical bar
to reimbursement exists in the case of a student who has not previously
received special education in public school, courts will continue to decide
individual cases on the equities. In essence, although Forest Grove clarified a hotly contested point of law, the practical implications of the case are
somewhat limited because the case only clarified who is eligible for
251
The framework courts must follow in deciding IDEA
reimbursement.
reimbursement cases remains unchanged.

244. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
245. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066-68 (D. Or. 2009).
246. Id. at 1066-67.
247. Id. at 1067.
248. Id.
249. Id. (quoting A.L.J.’s Final Order Findings of Fact ¶ 89).
250. Id. at 1068.
251. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2009) (clarifying that the
1997 Amendments to IDEA do not bar tuition reimbursement in the case of a child who has not
previously received special education under the authority of a public agency).
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In his dissent in Forest Grove, Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s
decision placed no limit on reimbursement in IDEA cases.252 Federal circuit court opinions handed down since Forest Grove both prove and disprove his point. In Ashland School District v. Parents of Student R.J.,253 the
Ninth Circuit denied reimbursement to the parents of a student eligible for
services under IDEA because his private school placement was not
“appropriate” under the Act.254 In Richardson Independent School District
v. Michael Z.,255 however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held a district
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding tuition reimbursement despite
the parents’ failure to notify the school district of the child’s withdrawal
from public school.256 Thus, it is clear courts continue to decide IDEA
257
The
reimbursement cases on the equities of individual circumstances.
entirety of the litigation that was Forest Grove serves to reinforce the vital
role of the equities in IDEA “appropriate relief,” a role that has been clearly
articulated by the Supreme Court since Burlington.258
V. CONCLUSION
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the United States Supreme
Court held § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not categorically bar reimbursement for
private school tuition when a child had not previously received special
education or related services through a public school.259 In clarifying the
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the
circuit courts and reinforced the validity of the well-established, equitybased framework used by courts in IDEA reimbursement cases.260
Although Forest Grove notably makes reimbursement an available remedy
to the parents of children who have not previously received special

252. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2497-98 (2009) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
253. 588 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2009).
254. Ashland, 588 F.3d at 1010-11. Essentially, the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Ashland that the United States District Court for the District of Oregon reached on
remand in Forest Grove. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Or.
2009).
255. 580 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009).
256. Richardson, 580 F.3d at 301.
257. See, e.g., Forest Grove, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (holding that, although tuition reimbursement was available to parents of a child who had not previously received special education
through a public agency, reimbursement was not warranted because “[t]he equities [did] not
favor” such a result).
258. C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 71 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he principles
stated [in Forest Grove] with regard to equitable relief under the IDEA are not new.”) (citing Sch.
Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985)).
259. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496.
260. Id.
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education in public school, the case’s impact on IDEA reimbursement cases
is, and will most likely remain, somewhat limited, due in most part to the
Act’s and the Supreme Court’s requirement that courts decide such cases
under equitable principles.261 The clarification of the meaning of IDEA’s
reimbursement provisions is significant, however, because it puts to rest a
costly period in the history of special education law.262
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